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 American cultural critics like to imagine that their 
society is so diverse in population, so gigantic in scale, so 
mobile and changeable, that it has no cultural identity; instead 
Americans are said to be distracted, fragmented, confused, and 
irrational, unable to connect or focus on anything.  In the 
United States, Saul Bellow gloomily says, "consciousness emptily 
asserts itself." (Bellow 1990) 
 Why exactly Americans (or, more accurately, American 
intellectuals) prefer to see their society as disjoined, 
vacillating, and vacant is a vexing question, but not one that I 
have time to address here. Instead, I want to draw attention to 
some of the central and taken-for-granted cultural values that 
do indeed give the United States a specific national character. 
Although an audience of American intellectuals might find my 
argument odd, it ought not be so unfamiliar to the French.  
After all, it was a Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, who drew 
the first, and still the best, outline of American identity.  
 Let me begin by reciting some obvious historical facts.  
The United States never had an old regime. As Seymour Lipset 
(1963) has written, it was the "first new nation"; it had its 
roots as a revolutionary society, and as a democratic one.  The 
American governmental system, constructed against the backdrop 
of British colonial authority, was and remains profoundly anti-
authoritarian, anti-state, and egalitarian.  Of course, the 
propertied elite in colonial times did support their own 
interests.  But the original US armed forces were made up of men 
who already held strong egalitarian and individualistic values.  
Just as importantly, these citizen soldiers owned their own 
weapons, and knew very well how to use them in defense of their 
hard-won freedom. 
 It is also worth stressing that the United States has 
developed into a remarkably stable and homogenous society - 
despite the reiterated fears of fragmentation and collapse.  The 
only truly painful division in the United States is the 
continuing racial polarization of black and white. And even 
there, no plausible threat of black revolution or separation has 
occurred, or is likely to occur. In the country at large, the 
notion of states' rights and a deep distrust of the federal 
government continue to have a powerful appeal to most Americans, 
but there has been no talk of secession since the Civil war. 
Class warfare in the United States has also been subdued. The 
vast majority of Americans see themselves as "middle-class."  
Essentially conservative, they seek to maintain the status 
positions while also striving for upward mobility. Social 
revolution is not on their agenda.  Nor is there any burning 
religious division among Americans, despite the fact that the 
United States is the most pious of developed nations.  This is 
because for Americans religion is a personal choice; so long as 
one believes in something spiritual, the actual content of 
belief is irrelevant. In fact, the main problem for religious 
groups in America is not persecution, but maintaining any kind 
of distinctiveness.  Finally, although the United States is 
truly a nation of immigrants, the overwhelming result of 
immigration has been assimilation.  Ethnic differences have 
become options, not essences. They are expressed in food 
preference and participation in parades, and serve to provide 
individuals a sense of distinction in a world that is remarkably 
homogenous.  Such weak identities rarely lead to conflict.  
Note, for instance, the very low number of anti-Arab incidents 
in the wake of 9/11.   
 The point is that the United States has long demonstrated a 
strong homogenizing nationalism capable of drawing its citizens 
away from any particular ethnic, class or religious identity.  
Alternative visions have been marginalized in favor of a 
standard notion of what America ought to be, namely, "the land 
of opportunity" where old settlers and new migrants, rich and 
poor, Protestant and Catholic, all participate equally. 
 In contrast, consider France, which has long been 
recognized as the most centralized, liberal, democratic, and 
modern of European states.  Yet, in comparison to the United 
States, France harbors within its borders many potentially very 
disruptive regional, class, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
distinctions. For example, there is nothing in the United States 
remotely resembling the separatist movements in Brittany or 
Corsica, which are based on deep and compelling linguistic, 
historical and cultural divisions. 
 If Americans have relatively little of content to divide 
them, they have much to stimulate unity.  Not least is a common 
faith in the pleasures and potentials of capitalism, which 
remains at the heart of the "American dream" of attaining wealth 
and luxury.  For Tocqueville, the American obsession with the 
money was best understood as a psychological consequence of an 
egalitarian classless society. As he wrote in 1840: "When the 
prestige attached to what is old has vanished, men are no longer 
distinguished, or hardly distinguished, by birth, standing, or 
profession; there is thus hardly anything left but money which 
makes very clear distinctions between men or can raise some of 
them above the common level" (Tocqueville 1969: 615). The 
intense competition of equals for status through wealth 
stimulates the conspicuous consumption of expensive goods that 
is the major route to prestige in American culture. (See Veblen 
1979).  
 The capitalist spirit coincides and corresponds with a 
shared faith that all persons are independent individuals, each 
separately responsible for his or her own fate and endowed with 
a God-given potential for free choice and agency. Ideally, all 
such persons are equal before God and the law, with equivalent 
rights and privileges, and all are worthy of respect regardless 
of wealth, prestige or power. This pervasive belief, derived in 
part from the historical absence of an aristocracy in the United 
States, in part from the culturally dominant Protestant faith in 
the capacity of individuals to choose their own fates, and in 
part from the great social mobility of American society, has 
always been expressed in ordinary interaction through an absence 
of deference and by strong moral demands for the expression of 
equal esteem for all members of the community.   
 As a result of this creed, Americans remain extremely 
careful to cloak all authority relations with the trappings of 
equality.  Subordinates are "team members" whose "consent" and 
"cooperation" are "requested" by their "supervisor". At home it 
is perfectly acceptable to have servants or to go to an elite 
school, but not to put the servants in livery or to have a 
genteel accent; in short, it is politically correct to be rich 
and powerful just so long as one does not make claims to be 
different and better.  The surest way to be ostracized by 
Americans is to have the reputation of being a snob; the surest 
way to be accepted is to be friendly and "nice" to everyone, 
regardless of status.   
 Such effacement might seem to conflict with the self-
assertiveness of Americans, who are well known for their 
confidence and expressivity.  Yet at the same time Americans 
place an extraordinarily high value on getting along well with 
others.  This seeming contradiction can be reconciled once we 
note that among Americans status and respect are awarded to 
those who are well liked by their peers. In this context it 
makes sense that the majority of Americans who easily adapt to 
the needs of others also express themselves with certainty and 
ease.  After all, they are showing themselves to be capable of 
participating in banter with their co-equals. Deference would be 
both embarrassing and unacceptable. 
 Americans "niceness", easy social interaction, and distaste 
for elitism makes functional sense in a fluid social world where 
there are no clear status markers; this unstable and potentially 
threatening universe is made liveable by the expectation that 
one's own friendliness and helpfulness will usually be 
reciprocated.  Such an attitude can only exist in conjunction 
with a basic sense of trust in the public sphere, which 
Americans think is populated by men and women who, like oneself, 
are basically fair, decent, and kindly.   
 This high degree of social trust is a legacy of the 
original Protestant covenanted community, now transformed into 
the larger secularized social world where the primary values are 
being "well liked" and "getting along well with others".  
Training toward these ends is clearest in the American school 
system, where popular students are elected as student body 
leaders whose job is to "represent" their fellows, where "school 
spirit" is heavily promoted, and where children are graded on 
the quality of their "citizenship".  Students are also expected 
to participate in extracurricular activities that oblige them to 
cooperate together on a voluntary basis.  Team sports especially 
are highly valued as an expression of "school spirit" and local 
pride, where individuals can show off their personal talents 
while helping their team mates to victory through disciplined 
self-sacrifice and cooperation. These institutions have nothing 
to do with formal education, everything to do with learning how 
to participate peacefully in a competitive society of co-equal 
individuals.   
  Alongside diffuse trust goes another characteristic 
American stance, that of "moral minimalism", which prohibits 
overt interference with or judgement upon other people 
(Baumgartner 1988).  This ethical position of benign detachment, 
like the requirement to be nice to everyone, is a product of the 
underlying American value system of individualistic 
egalitarianism, which means that all persons have the freedom to 
make their own fates, without restraint from their neighbors, 
and, concomitantly, should not meddle with anyone else either.  
This American pattern especially correlates with a roomy and 
fluid world, where there is rarely any need for individuals to 
confront one another.  For example, in American suburbs it is 
quite possible for members of the same household to have 
separate rooms, separate schedules, separate meals, and to 
almost never to come in contact. Under these conditions, 
Americans tolerate diversity, so long as they are not obliged to 
interact with others who are too different from themselves, that 
is, who are "snobs" or "not nice", or with people who are 
intrusive and make demands on their time and autonomy.  
 Beneath the generalized "niceness", social trust and moral 
minimalism of America stands the fundamental cultural premise 
that "individualism is natural, community problematical.  
Society has to be built" (Varenne 1977: 70).  Generated again 
from Protestant principles in the context of American social 
openness, this is a vision of society not as a pre-existent 
entity but as a moral corporation knitted together by voluntary 
agreements between independent and co-equal agents each bearing 
personal responsibility for their acts. The individual in this 
cultural framework is not empty, but is an actor pursuing his or 
her own ends, whether spiritual or monetary (or both).  The 
community is required to serve those ends, but it is not 
believed to pre-exist them, and it can be deconstructed when it 
no longer fulfills its purpose. The sense that community has no 
existence beyond the choices of the individuals who make it up 
is, I may hazard, the main source of American anxiety about the 
stability of their society.   
 In sum, America does have a unique culture that is based 
upon shared values of egalitarian individualism and capitalist 
free enterprize.  It has demonstrated an astonishing capacity to 
integrate new immigrants, to defuse religious, class and ethnic 
hostilities, and to promote a homogenized national culture.  It 
is animated by dreams of monetary success in the competitive 
marketplace, but this is softened by an ethic of generalized 
social trust and a pervasive interaction style that combines 
"niceness" with moral minimalism.  Within this shared frame of 
reference, Americans imagine their social universe to be, in its 
ideal form, based on the voluntary co-operation of co-equals 
engaged in the joint task of building a community.  From the 
point of view of its citizens, the United States is the best of 
all possible worlds, one that, by and large, delivers on its 
promises.  Instead of ethnic nationalism, Americans have the 
nationalism of an ideal. 
 We can say then that, despite rhetoric, the United States 
is not a society of great internal divergence.  Although there 
is a  plethora of noisy interest groups, there is little real 
recognition of genuinely alternative ways of life.  This point 
can be underscored by noting a standard European joke about 
American foreign policy: the United States wishes people to be 
free to choose--just so long as they choose the American way. 
And this is scarcely surprising: Americans have not really 
experienced the clash of utterly different ways of life.  
Rather, the differences that exist in American civilization are 
objectively relatively small: whilst ideologically "all are 
different", Americans in fact are remarkably "all the same."   
